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Justice Roberts states in his last remark of the opinion in Riley v California (2014), 
“Modern cell phones are not just another technological convenience. With all they contain and 
all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans “the privacies of life.” The fact that 
technology now allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the 
information any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought. Our answer to the 
question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is 
accordingly simple-get a warrant.” (Riley, pg. 14). 
In the ruling of Riley v. California (2014), the Supreme Court handed down a unanimous 
decision of the extent that police officers can proceed when conducting cell phone searches. 
Concluding that the exception of a search incident could no longer be applied to officers 
searching cell phone content without first obtaining a warrant. Over the years, individuals lived 
through democracy making sense of applying the Fourth Amendment to their daily lives. 
Initially, the Fourth Amendment only applied to federal government, leaving the state 
government to interpret the law as they please. This meant searching through people’s personal 
property without the need for a warrant or any repercussions that officers might endure for 
violating their rights. Currently, the Fourth Amendment limits the procedures the police take into 
searching and seizing an individual’s property, as well of the court system constantly trying keep 
the interest of individuals and police officers in balance with each other. Analyzing the cost and 
benefits between what warrantless searches can lead to prevents crime from occurring and 
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protects the people. This paper examines the United States Court of Appeals decision regarding 
whether police officers require a search warrant to search through individual’s cell phone content 
or not. It also factors in the requirement police officers need to tracking cell phone data location 
on an individual’s cell phone. By analyzing the Court of Appeals ruling of warrantless searches, 
it helps signal the Supreme Court setting precedent on the issue that would be applied to every 
court system.  Based off the fact the Circuit Courts have split decision of interpreting the law, 
their decision impacts the advantage police have in their procedure which would make their 
police work easier to detect. It also creates a disadvantage to police procedure by giving the 
people more rights that slows down the police procedure process.  
In modern time, cell phones have in sense become part of human’s intellectual way of 
thinking. When an officer searches the contents of the phone without a warrant, they have access 
to individual’s whole life records when they come across: personal text message exchanges with 
private individuals, contact information of individuals that one calls on a regular basis, 
photographs, calendars, e-mail, videos, and the record of internet use. Even though the Fourth 
Amendment aligns that officers need reasonable cause to search and seizure of an individual’s 
phone, it also recognizes several exceptions to the requirement of obtaining a warrant. One 
exception is the searches incident to a valid arrest. A police officer may conduct a search by 
placing a suspect under arrest that stands as valid. This is allowed for officers to remove 
weapons or other objects that might be hazardous to the officer and for preventing the suspect 
from disposing of evidence (Epstein, Lee, and Thomas G. Walker, pg. 480). Another exception is 
the loss of evidence searches. Police officers must act quickly in certain situations they are 
placed in. This exception allows officers to conduct warrantless searches and seizures to prevent 
the loss of evidence (Epstein, Lee, and Thomas G. Walker, pg. 480). Consent searches are the 
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exception to the Fourth Amendment. Police officers can conduct warrantless searches upon 
consent. This may not seem like an exception because the individual is voluntarily giving up 
their rights to the search, but nevertheless the consent to search an individual must be voluntary 
that cannot be coerced (Epstein, Lee, and Thomas G. Walker, pg. 480-481). Safety searches is 
another exception that takes in consideration the dangerous tasks that police risk their lives 
pursuing every day. A police officer may stop and pat down a suspect in a criminal case whom 
the police believe poses a threat to society to find and remove any weapons. Police have 
reasonable suspicion to believe that an individual is involved in criminal activity and the other 
being that the officers must have cause to believe the person is armed and dangerous (Epstein, 
Lee, and Thomas G. Walker, pg. 481). Another exception made to the Fourth Amendment is hot 
pursuit. The Court says that focusing on the apprehension of a fleeting suspect, warrantless 
searches to obtain evidence would be considered permissible (Epstein, Lee, and Thomas G. 
Walker, pg. 481). Lastly, the plain view doctrine has been established as reasonable for police 
officers to obtain evidence without a search warrant. Given that the officers be acting awfully 
when any sizable items come into plain view, they can seize evidence without a warrant 
authorizing them to seize those specific items (Epstein, Lee, and Thomas G. Walker, pg. 482). 
History of Warrantless Searches Incidents 
The 4th Amendment is indispensably important to America, but in modern society, it’s 
easy to forget how it applies to the daily lives of citizens. In today’s time, public safety has 
become a major concern for both the public and government officials, which leads to the public 
compromising their expectation of privacy. While protecting their collective future, some would 
say that society is taking a step back from what the 4th amendment interprets. The 4th 
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Amendments protects the right of the people by protecting them from unwarranted searches of 
individuals property by stating: 
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” (Epstein, Lee, and Thomas G. Walker, pg. 
780). 
As the Founders constructed the 4th Amendment, one question that has been debated 
throughout decisions involving the amendment is what constitute as an unreasonable search and 
seizure. Throughout the rulings of cases relating to the 4th Amendment, it is important to note 
that The Bill of Rights was catered originally to federal government meaning that the 4th 
Amendment was strictly for federal use before being applied to the state government. Over the 
years, courts have recurrently been called upon to determine how the 4th Amendment applies to 
search and seizure cases due to police conduct. One of the first cases courts had to grapple with 
issues related to constitutional violations committed by police while gathering evidence is the 
decision in Weeks v. United States (1914) (Epstein, Lee, and Thomas G. Walker, pg. 464). The 
defendant, Fremont Weeks, was arrested by a police officer at the Union Station in Kansas City, 
where he was employed. Other officers traveled to Weeks’ house, while unlawfully and without 
a warrant or authority to do so, entered his home where they seized much of Weeks’ possessions 
(pg. 386-387). To search for additional evidence, the officers returned to the residence of Weeks, 
without a search warrant, to seize more evidence such as; books, letters, money, papers, notes, 
evidences of indebtedness, stock, certificates, insurance policies, deeds, abstracts, and other 
muniments of title, bonds, candies, clothes, and other property (pg. 387). Weeks objects that any 
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of the evidence obtained from his property without a search warrant was a violation of his 4th and 
5th Amendment rights, which was objected by the court and he was later convicted. The history 
of the 4th Amendment is given by the Justices to make aware of what the 4th Amendment was 
intended to uphold in society. The Justices delivered the opinion that the framers of the 
Amendments to the Federal Constitution provide that the 4th Amendment would secure its 
purpose to the American people, among other things, those safeguards which had grown up in 
England to protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, such as were permitted 
under the general warrants issued under authority of the government (pg. 390). The Courts 
explains that the 4th Amendment is to limit the power and authority of the United States and 
Federal officials as to the exercise of their power and authority to secure the people from 
unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law. (pg. 392) They continue to make the 
distinction that:  
“if letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a 
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his right to be 
secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are 
concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution” (pg. 393). 
This ultimately led the Courts to enact the exclusionary rule to exclude evidence 
applicable to the search. Although the evidence seized that was used in Weeks conviction shows 
that he was guilty of the crime committed, but due to the insufficient condition the evidence was 
obtain, would not have led to a successful prosecution (Epstein, Lee, and Thomas G. Walker, pg. 
464). The Courts further their reasoning that even though the main goal of the courts is to bring 
justice to those worth punishable are not to be aided by the sacrifice of the great principles that 
the founders laid out as a foundation years ago (pg. 393). Due to their reasoning, the Courts 
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conclude that the possessions taken from Weeks’ property was a direct violation of Weeks’ 
constitutional rights. The precedent from the ruling of Weeks not only affected law enforcement 
procedures and criminal rules that protect the people against unreasonable government intrusion 
into their daily lives (Epstein, Lee, and Thomas G. Walker, pg. 464). 
Furthermore, the Courts proceed on what constitutes as an unreasonable search in the 
Chimel v. California (1969) decision. Police officers arrived at the home of the petitioner with a 
warrant authorizing his arrest for the burglary of a coin shop. Upon arrival, the officers waited 
with the permission of Chimel’s wife until Chimel returned home. As he returned, he was given 
an arrest warrant and was asked for permission to look around the residence. When Chimel 
objected, he was advised that ‘on the basis of the lawful arrest,’ the officers would be allowed to 
conduct a search without the necessity of a warrant in present (pg. 754). After searching the 
premises, the officers seized numerous items, primarily coins that were used to convict Chimel 
with charges of burglary. Chimel objected that the evidence should not be admitted into his trial 
because they have been unconstitutionally seized. The courts held that since the arresting officers 
had acquired the warrant ‘in good faith,’ and since in any event they had had sufficient 
information to constitute probable cause for the petitioner’ s arrest, that the arrest had been 
lawful (pg. 754). The Courts question in this ruling is whether the warrantless search of Chime’s 
entire house can be constitutionally justified as incident to his arrest. The Court disputed that 
whatever is found upon a person or in their control that is unlawful for them to have when 
arrested for an offense can be used to prove the offense can be sized and held as evidence in the 
prosecution (pg. 755-756). The Court states that the framers of the Fourth Amendment required 
adherence to judicial processes wherever possible to provide security against unreasonable 
intrusions in individuals private lives. (pg. 758-759). The Courts corroborated a previous court 
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precedent that the absent of a search warrant interposes a magistrate between the citizen and the 
police. Noting that this is done not to shield criminals nor to make the home safe haven for 
illegal activities, but that an objective mind might weight the need to invade that privacy in order 
to enforce the law (pg. 761). The Courts emphasized that the scope of a search must be strictly 
tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible (pg. 762). The 
Courts ultimately ruled that the search of Chimel property had no constitutional justification, in 
the absence of a search warrant, for extending the search beyond the premise of what was 
required from the officers that violated Chimel’s Fourth and Fourteenth rights (pg. 768). 
Curiously enough, Justice White dissented in the Courts decision stating that he found it 
unreasonable to require the police to leave the scene of the arrest to obtain a search warrant when 
they are already legally there to make a valid arrest (pg. 774). While the Court ruled in favor for 
Chimel, it is important to note that the Court also states that it is reasonable for the arresting 
officer to search the person arrested to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use to 
resist arrest and effect his escape. Therefore, making it reasonable for the officer to search for 
and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person to prevent its concealment or destruction as well 
as the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items (pg. 
763). This gives precedent to the search and seizure because it gives authorization for searches of 
the area within the grabbing reach of the person under arrest or detained and barring searches of 
what the people arrested cannot get to within reaching distance. Terry v. Ohio (1968) modeled 
this precedent because the police officer witness two men pacing a store and suspected the men 
were going to rob the store which allowed him to act on his suspicion. The officer stopped the 
men and asked for identification and then frisked Terry and founded a pistol (Epstein, Lee, and 
Thomas G. Walker, pg. 493). Terry argues that the officer lacked probable cause to stop and frisk 
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him. The Court found it reasonable stating that: “We therefore reject the notions that the Fourth 
Amendment does not come into play at all as a limitation upon police conduct if the officers stop 
short of something called a “technical arrest” or a “full-blown search”” (Epstein, Lee, and 
Thomas G. Walker, pg. 495). Just like in the Chimel case, in Terry, the officer conducted his 
search was no broader than a pat down of Terry instead to ensure protective purposes. 
 In United States v. Robinson (1973) the Court restated its understandings that any 
individual placed under arrest are subjected to a full search without a search warrant. Probable 
cause leads a police officer to arrest Robinson for driving while his license was revoked. The 
police officer made a full-custody arrest for the offense. In the course of searching Robison, the 
officer found in Robinson’s coat pocket a cigarette package containing heroin which leads to the 
conviction of Robinson for a drug offense (pg. 218). The Court of Appeals reverse the ruling 
deciding that the officer must have conducted a limited frisk even after the officer lawfully 
places a suspect under arrest for taking him into custody. The officer is not allowed to proceed to 
fully search the arrestee (pg. 227). Terry v Ohio (1968) takes precedent in the ruling of the 
Courts. In Terry, the Court rules that: “At the time he seized petitioner and searched him for 
weapons, Office McFadden had reasonable grounds to believe that the petitioner was armed and 
dangerous, and it was necessary for the protection of himself and others to take swift 
measures...” (Epstein, Lee, and Thomas G. Walker, pg. 496). Taking from Terry, The Court 
states that a search incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional exception to the warrant requirement 
of the 4th Amendment. Being upheld by two propositions: the first is that a search may be made 
of the person of the arrestee by virtue of the lawful arrest; the second is that a search may be 
made of the area within the control of the arrestee (pg. 224). The Court further makes it case by 
reciting that it is intended to maintain society’s interest in having its laws obeyed, and it is 
  Taylor 11 
 
inevitably accompanied by future interference with the individual’s freedom of movement 
whether the arrestee is detained (pg. 228).  The Court refutes the Court of Appeals inquiry of a 
case-by-case adjudication being required. Thus, making the argument that a police officer’s 
determination as to how and where to search the person he detains is necessarily a quick ad hoc 
judgement which the Fourth Amendment does not require to be broken down in each instance 
into a step-by-step analysis concluding that the search made by the officer was permitted under 
the 4th Amendment (pg. 235). The impact from the ruling of Robinson authorizes a search of a 
arrestee incident to any lawful arrest. 
Circuit Court Approaches to Regulation Cell Phone Searches 
The Federal Court of Appeals are for the most part split on the issue of whether what 
constitutes as reasonable for an individual’s cell phone to be searched when detained by officials. 
While examining how the courts are split on deciding on the issue, it also explicates how the 
Supreme Court are sought out for their service as a “tiebreaker” to resolve the Circuit court split. 
 The District of Columbia rule in favor of a law that protects the people not just from 
warrantless cell phone searches made by the police, but protection of having their data tracked by 
the police as well. This leads the Court to rule that the warrantless use of a cell-site simulator 
violated the Constitution. In Prince Jones v. United States (2017), the case arose from the 
defendant’s arrest in 2013 for incidents involving sexual assault and robbing on two individual 
women. In each incident, the defendant stole each woman’s cell phone, which allowed the 
officers to obtained phone records, in which they found the same number to contact each 
individual woman. From there, with the help of the MPD’s Technical Services Unit, the police 
were able to track the suspect’s and the complainants’ phones (pg. 708). Go to the location 
equipped with a cell-site simulator to track the suspect to a parked car. After conviction at the 
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trail court, the defendant appealed his convictions claiming his Fourth Amendment rights had 
been violated since most of the evidence used to sentence him stemmed from a warrantless and 
unlawful “stingray” (pg. 707). While making the decision to reverse the defendant’s conviction, 
the Court noted that the government violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights when the 
police arrayed the cell-site simulator against him without first obtaining a warrant based on 
probable cause as well as the government’s good-faith doctrine argument (pg. 707). The Court 
first turns to whether the government’s use of the cell-site simulator to locate the defendant’s 
cellphone constituted a search or seizure. One of the consequences of a cell phone user is that 
they carry it everywhere they go. Along that locating and tracking a cellphone using a cell-site 
simulator has the substantial potential to expose the owner’s intimate personal information. (pg. 
711). The government testified how the cell-site simulator they used works based on the 
information that’s publicly available. As soon as the simulator comes across a target’s phone 
signal, it grabs it and it holds on to it and then begins to report the general location information 
and signal strength that can locate the target’s phone’s exact location (pg. 709-710). Due to this 
fact, the Court concluded that cell phone tracking can easily invade the right to privacy in one’s 
home or other private areas. Secondly, a person’s “familial, political, professional, religious, and 
sexual associations” can be observed by a cell-site simulator due to cell phone user’s public 
movements, revealing sensitive information. Lastly, a cell-site simulator can be used by the 
government not merely to track a person but to locate him or her. (pg. 712). They took into 
consideration that the cell-site simulator exploits a security vulnerability in the phone; being as 
the defense expert claims as “dumb devices” as they are unable to differentiate between a 
legitimate cellular tower and a cell-site simulator imitating as one. Leaving cell phone users, the 
only option to turn off their phones and its radios, thus forgoing its use as a communication 
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device (pg. 713). Given this expense of the cell-site simulator, the Court believes it invades a 
reasonable expectation of privacy when it located the defendant’s location. People justifiably 
seek to keep sensitive personal information from being exposed from a cell-site simulator. The 
Court further quote that permitting the government to implement a tool as powerful as the cell-
site simulator without judicial oversight would “shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy” in 
which corresponds in relation to the Fourth Amendment (pg. 714). 
 In United States v. Jones (2012), when deciding whether a (GPS) tracking device in an 
individual vehicle constitutes as a search or seizure within the terms of the Fourth Amendment, 
the Court reiterated in the case that the government physically occupied private property for the 
purpose of obtaining information, having no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have 
been considered a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment (Epstein, Lee, and 
Thomas G. Walker, pg. 473). The Court upheld the “good faith” exception in the case given that 
wiretaps attached to telephone wires on the public streets did not constitute a Fourth Amendment 
search because there was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendant (Epstein, Lee, and 
Thomas G. Walker, pg. 473). As the Supreme Court upholding the warrantless search in the 
Jones case, the Court of Appeals justices in Prince Jones express the opposite. Stating that the 
government contends that because a cellphone “must continuously broadcast a signal,” cellphone 
users are engaging in “conduct [that] is not calculated to keep [his] location private and gave no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his location (pg. 715). Not only that, the Court would not 
allow the good-faith exception given that cellphone use has become so integrated into society 
and the daily lives of customers that accessing such sensitive data would require for the police to 
obtain a warrant. The home and offices that the police are not invading in the Jones case are 
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stored into the phones of users of the information that they would store in their homes and 
offices. 
The First Circuit Court ruled that the police are required to have a warrant to search data 
within cell phones. In the First Circuit Court of Appeals, United States v. Wurie (2013), the 
judges conclude that police seizing a cell phone from an individual’s person as part of his lawful 
arrest and searching the phone’s data without a warrant exceeds the boundaries of the Fourth 
Amendment search-incident-to-arrest exception (pg. 1). On September 5, 2007, a Boston Police 
Sergeant was performing a routine surveillance when he observed Brima Wurie in his parked car 
in what he suspects to believe a drug sale taking place in the car. After the sale takes place, the 
officer and his backup stopped the suspected buyer and found crack cocaine in his pocket. The 
suspected buyer told the police that he brought the drugs from Wurie in the car where the sale 
took place. Another officer had been following the description of the car Wurie have been 
driving and arrested him upon Wurie parked his car. Upon arriving to the station, Wurie’s 
personal property was confiscated which included two cell phones. After noticing that one of the 
cell phones collected was receiving calls from a number identified as “my house” on the external 
caller ID screen in plain view, the officers opened the phone to look at Wurie’s call log (pg. 1-2). 
The officers pressed a button on the phone, which allowed them to access the phone’s call log. 
The call log shows incoming calls from “my house.” The officers pressed one more button to 
determine the phone number associated with “my house” caller ID reference. After typing the 
number into an online directory matching an address with the number, the officers took the keys 
collected among the possession taken from Wurie at the station and went to the address 
associated with the “my house” number. The officers entered the home of the address while 
obtaining a search warrant and found large amounts of drugs along with cash, which leads to 
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Wurie being charged with possession with intent to distribute among other charges (pg. 2). With 
the trial court denying the motion to suppress evidence, Wurie was found guilty on all counts. 
The First Appellate Court starts out by stating that courts have grappled with the question of 
whether the search-incident-to-arrest exception extends to data within an arrestee’s cell phone 
(pg. 3). Going on to state that in the Fourth Amendment context, “a single, familiar standard is 
essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and 
balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront” 
(pg. 6). Affirming that a cell phone, like any other item carried on the person, can be thoroughly 
searched incident to a lawful arrest, reasoning that: (1) Wurie’s cell phone was an item 
immediately associated with his person, because he was carrying it on him at the time of his 
arrest; (2) such items can be freely searched without any justification beyond the fact of the 
lawful arrest; (3) the search can occur after the defendant has been taken into custody and 
transported to the station house and (4) there is no limit on the scope of the search, other than the 
Fourth Amendment’s core reasonableness requirement (pg. 7). The Circuit Court starts finding 
discrepancies in the reasoning behind the government’s argument on the subject of the 
warrantless search of data within a cell phone. The Circuit Court reject the government notion 
that a cell phone can be compared to other items carried on a person implies that individuals in 
modern society store much more personal information on their cell phones than could ever fit in 
a wallet, address book, briefcase, or any of the other traditional containers that the government 
has invoked (pg. 9). While also arguing that the government does not support its argument that 
cell phone data searches are justified by a need to protect arresting officers, perceiving that 
Wurie allows that arresting officers can inspect a cell phone to ensure that it is not actually a 
weapon. The Circuit Court sees no reason to believe that the officer safety would require a 
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further intrusion into the phone’s contents (pg. 9). Using the contents of Robinson, where the 
officer conducting the search had no idea what he might find in the cigarette pack, which 
therefore posed a safety risk. On the other hand, the officers who searched Wurie’s phone knew 
exactly what they would find therein: data. They also knew that the data could cause no harm to 
them (pg. 10). The Circuit Court also rejects the notion made by the government that phone’s 
data content search was necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence. The government points 
out the possibility that the calls on Wurie’s call log could have been overwritten or the contents 
of his phone remotely wiped if the officers had waited to obtain a warrant. Where the 
government goes wrong the Courts conjecture is that the officers had methods to prevent 
overwriting of calls or remote wiping of information that was not set in place that was simply not 
taken into consideration (pg. 11). One option is to turn the phone off or remove its battery. 
Secondly, they could have put the phone in a Faraday enclosure, which shields the interior from 
external electromagnetic radiation. Lastly, the officers might have been able to copy the entire 
cell phone contents, to preserve them should the battery remotely wiped, without looking at the 
copy unless the original disappears. Without using the methods, the officers risk loss of the 
evidence during the time it takes them to search through the phone (pg. 11). While weighing 
everything into place, the Circuit Court found the government’s reasoning as insufficient stating 
that even though the methods that are put into place to help the officers secure their evidence 
properly could be less convenient in taking the steps as it would be conducting a full search of a 
cell phone’s data incident to arrest, the government has not proven otherwise that the methods 
are unworkable, while bearing the burden of justifying its failure to obtain a warrant (pg. 11). 
The Circuit Court holds that rules are put into place for all warrantless cell phone searches that 
are based off previous instances in which the police do not take advantage of the unlimited 
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potential presented by cell phone data searches. Holding that since the government could not 
provide that a search-incident-to-arrest exception was necessary, it does not authorize the 
warrantless search of data on a cell phone seized from arrestee’s person (pg. 13). 
 In United States v Leon (1984), the good-faith exception is used to the exclusionary rule 
which the Circuit Court overlooked. Based on observation and surveillance of residences of drug 
activities from an unproven reliable tip, a police officer drew up an affidavit to obtain a search 
warrant. The warrant was issued, and the officers were able to seize large quantities of drugs at 
several residences. The argument is that the search warrant was invalid due to how the original 
informant lacked credibility; therefore, the judge did not have probable cause to issue the warrant 
(Epstein, Lee, and Thomas G. Walker, pg. 505). Justice White concurred that: “the marginal or 
nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable 
reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of 
exclusion” (Epstein, Lee, and Thomas G. Walker, pg. 507). Reasoning that the officers acted 
within judicious reliance of a search warrant issued. This would be arduous to prove for Wurie 
because the officers did not act on the preventive methods to diffuse the information on the 
phone in a productive matter. 
In the ruling in United States v Caraballo (2016), the Second Circuit Court decided that 
the police are not in violation of the Fourth Amendment when they “pinged” a suspect cellphone 
in the case that ‘exigent circumstances’ exist. The details of the case follow that the defendant, 
who is well-known drug dealer, was under investigation by the police. After the body of an 
associate of the defendants was discovered, the officers asked Sprint, the defendant’s cell-phone 
provider, to track the GPS coordinates of the defendant’s cell phone to investigate the death of 
the associated (pg. 97). Due to the sensitivity of the cases primarily involving narcotics, officers 
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worked diligently with confidential informants of the defendant because they believed that it was 
necessary to obtain the defendant’s location or “potentially some was going to get hurt or killed” 
(pg. 98). Compiling with the officers, the cell phone provider was able to locate the defendant, 
where he was later apprehended. The defendant contents for a motion to suppress evidence 
recovered upon his arrest, citing that the “pinging” of his cell phone was a search in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment. The court commences by stating “the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment must yield in those situations in which exigent circumstances require law 
enforcement officers to act without delay.”  The court found that due to exigent circumstances, it 
justified the police in pinging the defendant’s phone (pg. 101). An understanding that comes 
about “exigent circumstances” is a way for government to bypass procedure of obtain a warrant 
due to possibility that evidence would be lost or harm would be done to the public. Further 
reviewing officers’ response of conducting the “pinging”, the officers considered other methods 
to track down the defendant; having a confidential informant contact him, as well as posting 
police on major roadways to identify his vehicle as it left the state. (pg. 99). They also thought to 
obtain a search warrant to ask the defendant’s cell carrier for the location of the defendant. Due 
to the time that would have been lost securing the warrant “in the absence of exigent 
circumstances,” the officers believed that the provider’s slow compliance with the warrant would 
cause a huge delay in receiving the information. They justified their warrantless search to the fact 
that the officers believed that the law permitted them to request a warrantless search of a phone’s 
GPS location if there was an emergency involving a threat of serious bodily injury or death (pg. 
pg. 99). Evermore, the Court affirmed that even if the officers’ actions violated the defendant’s 
rights under the Fourth Amendment, submission of the exclusionary rule would be unsuitable in 
this case because the officers relied on good faith (pg. 100-101). While coming to the core 
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question of the case in applying the exigent-circumstances doctrine, the court approved the 
notion of the government. First, the court agreed with the government contention that the officers 
reasonably believed that the defendant’s posed an imminent threat to law enforcement, mainly 
the undercover informants on the case. Second, the court agreed with the government argument 
that the delay associated with securing a warrant would result in the destruction of evidence (pg. 
104). 
In United States v Katzin (2014), the Third Circuit Court reigned in the ruling that law 
enforcement must obtain a warrant based on probable cause to carry out a GPS device on any 
moveable object. While investigating a series of pharmacy burglaries, the police was able to 
identify one of the defendants as a suspect. After making out the model of the defendant’s van, 
without a warrant, officers attached a battery powered “slap-on” GPS device of the defendant’s 
van while it was parked on a public street (pg. 167-168). After later arresting the defendants, the 
defendants pushed to suppress the evidence recovered from the van, while also arguing that their 
Fourth Amendment rights were violated due to the warrantless installation and monitoring of the 
GPS device (pg. 168). Eventually having the evidence suppressed by the district court, the 
government appealed. While the ruling of the United States v. Jones case at the District of 
Columbia just passed where the court states that that for police to attach a GPS tracker device 
onto a car, they must first obtain a warrant. While acknowledging the ruling, however, the 
government argued that the good faith exception should apply (pg. 168-169). Firmly abiding by 
the Jones case, the Third Circuit Court firmly rejected the government’s argument. The court 
stated their concerns of a “slap-on” GPS tracker because it is magnetically attaches to the 
exterior of a target vehicle and requires no electronic connection to the automobile. What makes 
the difference to them is that the GPS technology is vastly different from more primitive tracking 
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devices of former time technology, such as a beeper. While the beeper requires the police to 
expend resources of time and manpower to follow a vehicle, the GPS device uses a network of 
satellites to determine its own location that anyone with the access can analyze and monitor the 
location data (pg. 193-194). While understanding to the facts of the case, the government recalls 
that the Fourth Amendment only prohibits “unreasonable” searches and seizures. Searches that 
are conducted in the absent of a warrant are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment are 
subject to certain exceptions. Quickly discarding any room for an exception to apply, the court 
goes on to say one cannot violate a constitutional amendment to justify an illegal act; there is no 
constitutional right to have the evidence of the illegal search suppressed (pg. 169-170). This 
addresses the government’s good faith exception: the court states that the application of the good 
faith exception turns on whether the agents at the time of monitoring the defendants would have 
known that it was unconstitutional (pg. 179). While the government makes the point that they 
had reason to believe that the warrantless GPS search was legal because the GPS tracker was 
effective on the defendant’s vehicle before either this Circuit or the Supreme Court had spoken 
on the constitutional propriety of such an endeavor. In this case of no guidance from either court, 
law enforcement could look to sister circuits to find the universe of case law (pg. 190). However, 
the court states that when the officers decide to take the Fourth Amendment inquiry into their 
own hands, rather than to seek a warrant from a neutral magistrate, they are acting in a 
constitutionally reckless fashion (pg. 192). The court set a precedent of officers implementing a 
warrant to tracking an individual using a GPS device. The thought that the police can slap a 
tracking device on any merely subject in a case was not envisioned by the framers of the 
Constitution when they amended the Fourth Amendment. The entire issue could be avoided by 
requesting a warrant, which is unburdened by time nor trouble (pg. 191). 
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 The Fourth Circuit Court district allowed for cell phones to be searched when the 
individual at hand was arrested. In United States v Murphy (2009), a Virginia State Trooper 
pulled over a vehicle traveling 95 miles per hour. Having determined that no one in the vehicle 
had a valid driver’s license, the Trooper prepared to have the vehicle towed along with additional 
officer assistance to help determine the identity of the vehicle’s occupants and conducting an 
inventory of the vehicle’s contents that is required by state police (pg. 407-408). Do to one of the 
vehicle’s occupants providing multiple names and that his identity could not be verified, was 
arrested for obstruction of justice, while later identity of the defendant was later revealed. During 
the inventory of the items seized from the vehicle, the Trooper became aware of some cell 
phones seized contained possible incriminating information which was later logged in as 
evidence. Analyzing the data of phone including text messages from an unknown individual who 
admitted in a phone interview with the officer that defendant was his drug supplier (pg. 409). 
The defendant moved to suppress evidence concluding that the cell phone was seized during a 
search incident to arrest because there was no evidence presented to indicate that the cell phone 
was located on him at the time of the arrest as well that the officers had no authorization to 
examine the contents of the phone without first obtaining a warrant (pg. 410). He argues that the 
warrantless search of the contents of the cell phone was not lawful because there was no 
evidence of the volatile nature of the cell phone’s information and it was not contemporaneous 
with his arrest (pg. 410-411). To further explain his argument in depth, the defendant claims that 
a cell phone may be searched without a warrant base of the phone’s storage capacity, conceding 
that a device with a small storage capacity may be searched without a warrant due to the volatile 
nature of the information stored. Proceeding on the other hand that a search of a cell phone with 
a larger storage capacity would implicate a heightened expectation of privacy and would require 
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a warrant to be issued before searching of its contents (pg. 411-412). The Court rejects Murphy’s 
argument on several reasons. First, Murphy has not supplied the Court with any standard by 
which to determine what would constitute a “large” storage capacity as opposed to a “small” 
storage capacity, as he does not quantify the meaning of these terms in any way. The next reason 
being that Murphy has not produced any evidence that his cell phone was categorized as a 
“large” storage capacity to his contention, heightens expectation of privacy (pg. 411). Even if 
Murphy could prove his phone as a “large” storage capacity, information on the size of the 
device would not make the information stored in the devices any less valuable no more the 
storage capacity. Lastly, the Court corrects Murphy’s argument because to require police officers 
to ascertain the storage capacity of a cell phone before conducting a search would simply would 
be unreasonable to the officer due to the unlikeliness of knowing whether the content on the 
phone will be preserved or be automatically deleted simply by looking at the cell phone (pg. 
411). 
 One case in relations of Murphy, is the opinion of the court in Maryland v King (2013) 
given by Justice Kennedy that: “there can be little reason to question “the legitimate interest of 
the government in knowing for an absolute certainty the identity of the person arrested...” 
(Maryland, pg.3). It would be of absolute little reason for officers to consider what constitutes as 
a “large” or “small” storage capacity to when they can search a cell phone that does not requires 
a warrant and when it would be appropriate. As Justice Kennedy said, “new technology will only 
further improve its speed and therefore its effectiveness” (Maryland, pg.3). As technology 
continues to advance, it would not only be a burden but unreasonable for officers to keep up with 
the changing times. 
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 In United States v. Finley (2007), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that police 
officers could search cell phone without a warrant when the individual is arrested. On August 19, 
2005, the defendant was detained by the DEA. They searched the defendant’s person and seized 
a cell phone that was in his pocket. The phone belonged to the company the defendant worked 
for, but he was also allowed to use the phone for personal purposes as well (pg. 253-254). During 
the questioning, the defendant’s cell phone records and text messages that were searched through 
revealed to him relating narcotics use and trafficking, later charging him with possession among 
other things (pg. 254). The defendant contends the motion to suppress the call records and text 
messages seized during the search. An important gesture he endeavors to argue is that the police 
had no authority to examine the phone’s contents without a warrant since the cell phone is 
analogous to a closed container. The court corrects the defendant that the permissible scope of a 
search incident to a lawful arrest extends to containers found on the arrestee’s person, holding 
that police may search containers, whether open or closed, located within arrestee’s reach (pg. 
259-260). The Court disagree with the government assertion that the defendant did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy of the cell phone because it was a business phone issued to 
him by his employer. Determining whether a defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
sufficient to contest a valid search, it is inquired (1) that the defendant is able to establish an 
precise subjective expectation of privacy with respect to the place being searched or items being 
seized and (2) whether that expectation of privacy is one which society would recognize as 
reasonable (pg. 258). The Court took into consideration to the required rule whether the 
defendant has a possessory interest in the thing seized or the place search, and whether he has a 
right to exclude others from that place, whether he has exhibited an subjective expectation of 
privacy that it would remain free from governmental intrusion, whether he took normal 
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precautions to maintain privacy, and whether he was legitimately on the premises (pg. 258-259). 
What the Court concludes is that the defendant maintained a property interest in the phone that 
he acquired from his employer which gave him the right to exclude others from using the phone. 
He also exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy in the phone and took normal precautions 
to maintain his privacy in the phone (pg. 259). Upon their review, the Court found the search as 
lawful citing that officers may look for evidence of the arrestee’s crime on his person to preserve 
it for use at trial. While also citing that no warrant was required to examine the content of the 
defendant’s phone since the search was conducted pursuant to a valid custodial arrest (pg. 260). 
 One take away is that the court determined an expectation of privacy that individuals are 
entitle to. Since the phone was work related and the property of the defendant’s employer, the 
court resulted in that the defendant was entitled to an expectation of privacy from outside 
intrusion. The Fifth Circuit court concluded that the defendant had a property interest in his 
cellphone and a right to exclude others from using it. In Katz v. United States (1967), Katz 
challenged the use of the transcripts recorded of him, in a public telephone booth, as evidence 
against him stating that the telephone booth was a “constitutionally protected area” (Epstein, 
Lee, and Thomas G. Walker pg. 467). The court stated that the correct solution of Fourth 
Amendment problems is not promoted an enchantment of the phrase “constitutionally protected 
area.” As well that the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional 
“right to privacy.” (Epstein, Lee, and Thomas G. Walker pg. 467). In Finley, the Fourth 
Amendment protected the defendant’s privacy from government intrusion when it came to him 
on his phone, more so than any set location since the Fourth Amendment does not extend to the 
protection in any area. 
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 Echoing the different ruling as the District of Columbia Circuit Court, the Sixth Circuit 
court held that using a GPS to track a motorhome vehicle did not constitute as a search in United 
States v. Skinner (2012). The case commences with the opinion of Circuit Judge Rogers, stating 
that when criminals use technological devices to carry out such criminal acts, they can hardly 
complain when the police take advantage of the inherent characteristics of those devices to catch 
them, given that the Constitution does not protect the criminal’s expectations regarding the 
imperceptibility of their cellphones (pg. 774). The defendant appeals that the use of a GPS 
location information emitted from his cell phone was a warrantless search that violated the 
Fourth Amendment, citing the lack of sufficient evidence to find him guilty (pg. 777). While the 
government used data from the defendant’s phone to determine his real-time location as the 
defendant transported drugs along the public thoroughfares between states where they 
confiscated a motorhome filled with drugs, the Court upholds the conviction of the defendant as 
there was no Fourth Amendment violation and the defendant did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the data emanating from his cell phone that showed his location (pg. 
774-775). The Court starts off by stating that there was no Fourth Amendment violation in the 
defendant’s case because he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data given 
off by his voluntarily procured prepaid cell phone. Given the uniqueness of a device such as a 
cellphone gives off a signal that can be tracked for location, certainly the police could pick up on 
the signal to track the defendant. The Court gives the analogy that the defendant could not be 
entitled to rely on the expected cellphone that was untraceable. If the case stands, dogs could not 
be used to track a fugitive if the fugitive did not know that the dog hounds had his scent (pg. 
777). Technology is not an exception to the law because if the defendant had an expectation of 
his privacy in this instance, technology would help criminals and not the police. The Court 
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continues in saying law enforcement tactics must be allowed to advance with technological 
changes to prevent criminals from circumventing the justice system (pg. 777-778). While there 
may have been situations where police can track a person’s activities that the very 
comprehensiveness of the tracking is unreasonable to the Fourth Amendment, but prior to certain 
advances in technology, “practical” considerations often offered “the greatest protections of 
privacy” (pg. 780). 
 The ruling in Skinner imitates the same ruling that the Court gave in Katz v United States 
(1967). Particularly, in Katz, the court states that since the electronic device employed to achieve 
that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance 
(Epstein, Lee, and Thomas G. Walker, pg. 468). The court in Skinner states that the tracking of 
the defendant’s cellphone for a relatively short amount of time monitoring of his movements on 
public streets was reasonable in accords to the expectations of privacy (pg. 780). While the GPS 
penetrated the motorhome, the court disregard that it would give constitutional significance to 
the cases, they relied on the fact that technological changes requires the officers to conduct a 
level of extreme comprehensive tracking (pg. 780). In other words, it triumphs Katz because 
during the time period, society was less technologically advanced to understand the lengths 
officers now have to go through to close a case. 
While the Federal Courts established precedents of the allowance of warrantless searches 
of GPS data location, the lower courts ruled that police officers need a warrant to carry out 
warrantless cellphone searches. In State v. Smith, the court asked whether the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution prohibits the warrantless search of data within a cell phone 
when the phone is lawfully seized incident to an arrest (pg. 163). The defendant is arrested for 
trafficking cocaine among other drug related convictions. During the arrest, the police searched 
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the defendant and found a cell phone on his person. The police did not have a warrant of the 
defendant’s phone content when the officer checked the call records and phone numbers on his 
cell phone. During trial, the court ruled that it would allow the permit testimony regarding the 
cell phone’s call records and phone numbers, excluding the use of photographs on the phone (pg. 
164). The court ultimately found the defendant guilty on all counts. The defendant appealed, 
arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the evidence found on his cell phone. The 
defendant bases his challenge on the Fourth Amendment. While it is well established that 
searches conducted without a warrant are unreasonable, while being subjected to certain 
exceptions, the exception in this case is “the search incident to arrest, which allows officers to 
conduct a search that includes an arrestee’s person and the area within the arrestee’s immediate 
control” (pg. 165). Searches may also extend to the personal effects of an arrestee, being held 
that it is reasonable for police to search any container or article on a defendant’s person in 
accordance with established inventory procedures (pg. 165). The court’s approach to determine if 
the warrantless search of the defendant’s cell phone is by characterizing it by fact-driven 
reasoning from pass cases. If they characterized the defendant to the United States v. Finley 
approach, where the Fifth Circuit analyzed Finley’s cell phone to a closed container found on an 
arrestee’s person, the defendant does not concede that his cell phone is corresponding to a closed 
container (pg. 166-167). The court tried characterizing the facts to United States v. Park, where 
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted a defendant’s 
motion to suppress the warrantless search of his cell phone because the search of the cell phone’s 
contents was not conducted out of concern for the officer’s safety or to preserve evidence (pg. 
167). The court than characterized Smith’s case to closed containers. They disagreed with Finley 
and agreed with the Robinson approach. Their outlook on what a closed container constitutes as 
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is that a “closed container” have been physical objects capable of holding other physical objects. 
The Robinson approach shows a cigarette package containing drugs found in a person’s pocket. 
Once again, the defendant’s cell phone does not come into likeness as a closed container (pg. 
167-168). Lastly, the court tries to characterize the defendant’s case to see is he had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy. The court acknowledges that cell phone technology continuously 
advanced and that there are legitimate concerns regarding the effect of allowing warrantless 
searches of cell phones that can store large amounts of private data. While the court would not 
portray the defendant’s cell phone as having advanced technological capability, some of the 
phone’s functions included; text messaging and camera capabilities. Yet, they concluded that any 
standard phone comes with the same functions and that it would not be fair to require officers to 
discern the capabilities of a cell phone before acting accordingly (pg. 168). After analyzing the 
components to consider for the case, the court decided that an officer does not have the right to 
conduct a search of a cell phone’s contents incident to a lawful arrest without first obtaining a 
warrant. Citing that in alliances with the Fourth Amendment, the dissent fails to provide 
evidence that the justification behind the search of the defendant’s phone was to preserve the 
evidence or to ensure the officer’s safety (pg. 170-171). 
 The Seventh Circuit Court uphold that the police does not need a warrant to search 
through an arrested individual’s phone. In United States v Flores-Lopez (2012), the defendant 
was arrested in a drug operation sting for selling meth. Upon arresting the defendant and his 
accomplice, the officers searched the defendant and his truck and seized a cell phone from the 
defendant’s person and two other cell phones from the truck. At the scene of the arrest, an officer 
searched each cell phone for its telephone number, which was used to subpoena call history from 
the telephone company. The defendant was sentenced to 10 years in prison (pg. 804). The 
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defendant argues that the search of his cell phone was unreasonable because not conducted 
pursuant to a warrant. The phone number was not incriminating evidence, but it enables the 
government to obtain incriminating evidence which resulted from an illegal search (pg. 805). 
Judge Posner, giving the opinion of the Seventh Circuit Court, start off by giving the explanation 
that any object that can contain anything else, including data, is a container. After making the 
clarification, he proceeds to use a diary to give an example of a container in an accurate 
description. The diary is a container not only because of the pages that can conceal what is being 
displayed on the sheet, which gives the police justification in turning the page, but it is also a 
container of information just as a cell phone or a computer (pg. 805). He responds to the 
defendant argument that since a container found on an arrestee may be searched as an incident to 
the arrest even if the arresting officers don’t suspect that the container holds anything that affects 
their safety, the officer does not need any justification to search the defendant. Judge Posner is 
also aware of the rapid advancement in technology, stating that the potential invasion of privacy 
in searching a cell phone is more severe than in searching a “container.” This belief is coming 
into light of the judges that a computer, distinguishing a cell phone as a computer, is not just a 
regular phone book due to the amount of personal content a cell phone carries (pg. 805). Judge 
Posner makes a remark that in cases pertaining to a similar one they are examining, searches 
without a warrant have been upheld with it is considered reasonable. Being accepted by the 
officers’ reasonable concerns for their safety, but the defendant’s cell phone did not endanger 
any one when it was secured with the officers. However, from their knowledge of the defendant 
as a drug dealer, the phone contained evidence or that would lead to evidence (pg. 806). From 
past judgement used in United States v. Jones (2012), where the police monitored the activity of 
Jones by a GPS tracking device on his vehicle, the court declares that the government installation 
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of the GPS device on Jones’s vehicle and its use of the device to monitor the vehicle’s 
movements therefore would constitute as a search (Epstein, Lee, and Thomas G. Walker, pg. 
473). Furthering using that the government physically occupied private property for the purpose 
of obtaining information, the physical intrusion would be considered a search (Epstein, Lee, and 
Thomas G. Walker, pg. 473). Posner says that the court has went on to hold that a minimally 
invasive search would be lawful in the absence of a warrant, even when the usual reasons for 
excusing the failure to obtain a warrant are absent. It therefore corrects their past judgement in 
Jones, to update their ruling on the subject (pg. 806-807). Because society continuous changes in 
the sense of what is right it, the court must adjust their ruling to keep up with the constant 
change. The court later affirm search a “container” found on a person arrested to verify their 
identification and any information in relations to their arrest would be permissible. Answering 
the defendant’s argument, a cell phone number in the defendant’s phone can be found without 
searching the phone’s content (pg. 807). The court states that it is not clear that they need a law 
specific to cell phones or other computers. With that being said, if police are entitled to open a 
pocket diary to copy the owner’s address, they should be entitled to turn on a cell phone to learn 
its number. Agreeing to this only in regards of “remote wiping” where an individual could press 
a button on the cell phone to wipe its contents and at the same time sends an emergency alert to 
an outside source (pg. 807). Ending that the police did not search the contents of the defendant’s 
cell phone, but only to obtain the cell phone’s phone number, the defendant’s motion to suppress 
evidence was denied (pg. 810). 
 While the court did rule that police did not need a warrant to search the contents of an 
arrested individual’s phone, they also made it unclear as to whether do they think that an 
individual is entitled to privacy. Judge Posner states that the court is aware of the rapid change in 
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technology that could cell phones hold more sensible information than just a pocketbook and that 
the search would be a much more severe degree if the phone is searched. Later, he states that a 
minimally invasive search can be used in absence of a warrant. The court made it open that 
officers could search any individual’s phone without a warrant just if the content being search is 
pertaining to what the arrestee is subject to. Also, the court categorized all cell phone users as 
having motive to wipe their data anytime they are pulled over by the police. This leaves open a 
broad topic that police are aware of remote wiping and to preserve evidence of information they 
are known even aware of; cell phones can be searched without a warrant. 
 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals have most recently ruled in United States v Crumble 
(2018), that the police do not need a search warrant to search a cell phone. The interesting thing 
about this ruling is that a search warrant is not required when searching an abandoned cell phone. 
After police officers responded to reports of a shooting, the officers arrived on the scene to a 
wrecked vehicle, where the key were in the ignition and a handgun on the floorboard. After 
receiving information about the informants, the police eventually attained the defendant in 
custody and drove him back to the scene of the wrecked vehicle. When an officer searched the 
vehicle, he found a cell phone on the driver’s seat, which was secured in evidence. The next day 
the officer applied for a warrant for more information on the crime committed. After the warrant 
was issued, contents from the cell phone put the defendant at the time of the shootout, which lead 
to him being charged (pg. 658). The defendant moved to suppress the evidence recovered from 
the cell phone for he had not abandoned his Fourth Amendment rights to the phone being 
searched. Rejected by the district court that the evidence was admissible because the defendant 
abandoned the vehicle and the phone when he fled the scene and denied any knowledge of the 
vehicle. The court later states that the good-faith exception would be applied to the case even if 
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the officers did not have probable cause to search the cell phone (pg. 658). The opinion, given by 
Judge Shepherd, starts out that while it is established that a defendant would not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in abandoned property, the issue of the court is stated as: “the 
issue is not abandonment in the strict property right sense, but rather, whether the defendant in 
leaving the property has relinquished his reasonable expectation of privacy” (pg. 659). To 
determine abandonment of property depends on two factors: being in denial of ownership and 
physical relinquishment of the property.  One factor displayed to examine is that after the crash 
defendant fled the scene, leaving the vehicle wrecked on a stranger’s lawn. The vehicle’s keys 
were still in the ignition and it allowed easy access to wherever that was in the car with the back 
window shot out. The defendant claims he was not fleeing from the police, but rather attempting 
to get away from the shooter in the other vehicle that was targeting him (pg. 659). The court 
disregard the reasoning of the defendant for the officers reasoning that they believed that the 
defendant abandoned the vehicle and the contents found inside of it. The district court was 
correct in the abandonment of the vehicle, but not to the subjective intent of the reason the 
abandonment occurred. Another factor is that the defendant initially denied any knowledge of the 
wrecked vehicle, exhibiting his intent to abandon the vehicle and its contents. It was only the 
next day after the cell phone was seized that the defendant claims ownership of the vehicle. The 
court affirms the district court’s holding based on abandonment and does not need to consider 
whether the warrant was valid. (pg. 660).  
 The courts did not even consider whether a search warrant was need in this case due to 
the nature that the officers were under the assumption that the defendant has abandoned the 
vehicle. The defendant could not provide whether he had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
because he initially denied any knowledge of the vehicle. The conflict with this ruling is that 
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whenever a police officer came across a cell phone, did the officer assume that the phone was 
abandoned which gives them the right to search through the content of the cell phone? Or 
conversely, would the officers assume the phone is lost or misplaced? This would give police 
officers a major advantage of searching contents of a phone without a warrant if they assume 
every phone left unattended is abandoned. When a person’s entire life is stored away into a cell 
phone, it should not be assumed that the phone is abandoned. 
  The Ninth Circuit Court have reaffirmed the ruling of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Riley v. California (2014), ruling that police officers needs a warrant to be able to obtain 
information from an individual’s phone. In the case of United States v. Lara (2016), the question 
in concern is how does the Fourth amendment extends to the rights of a person on probation? In 
Lara, the defendant contends that his Fourth Amendment rights have been violated when 
probation officers conducted two warrantless, suspicion less searches of his cell phone. He also 
contends that the exclusionary rule requires the suppression of any content that was found on his 
cell phone (pg. 607). The defendant was subject to a term of probation to sign a “Fourth 
Amendment waiver,” that required him to submit his “person and property, including any 
residence, premises, container or vehicle” to search and seizure “without a warrant, probable 
cause, or reasonable suspicion” (pg. 607) After conducting a home probation search at the 
defendant’s residence, one of the officers spotted a cell phone on a table and examined it. 
Without asking the defendant’s permission to search the cell phone, the officer review the most 
recently sent text messages on the defendant’s cell phone and discovered messages containing 
images of a semiautomatic handgun that indicates the defendant involvement in the distribution 
of the sale of the gun (pg. 608). The officers search the rest of the defendant’s residence for the 
gun. The officers further received the cell phone for examination and found the GPS data 
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embedded in the images of the gun. The defendant was charged with a felon and moved to 
suppress the evidence as a result of illegal searches of his cell phone (pg. 608). The Circuit Court 
was not aligned in the government’s reasons to affirm the district court’s denial of defendant’s 
motion to suppress. The first contention of the government is that the defendant waived his 
Fourth Amendment rights. The courts held that probationers do not entirely waive their Fourth 
Amendment rights by agreeing to the conditions of their probation explaining that there is a limit 
on the price the government may exact in return for granting probation. The issue is whether the 
search he accepted was reasonable. Stating “any search made pursuant to the condition included 
in the terms of probation must necessarily meet the Fourth Amendment’s standard of 
reasonableness” (pg. 609). The court opposed the government’s content of the expectation of 
privacy of the defendant. Because the defendant is on probation, his reasonable expectation of 
privacy is lower than someone who has completed probation or who has never been convicted of 
a crime. Explaining that the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy is greater than that of 
another probationer because he was not convicted of a particularly “serious and intimate” offense 
(pg. 610). The court furthered explained that the cell-phone search condition of the defendant’s 
probation was not clear. The terms the defendant agreed to was to “submit his person and 
property, including any residence, premises, container…under his control to search and seizure.” 
The courts cite that the defendant’s cell phone was not a container and for the purpose of a 
search incident to arrest, calling a cell phone a container makes no sense (pg. 610). The court 
concludes that the defendant had a privacy interest in his cell phone and the data it contained. 
While recognizing that his privacy interest was in a sense diminished by the defendant’s 
probation status, but it was not diminished since he accepted an unequivocal consent waiver (pg. 
611-612). The court concludes that the search of Lara’s cell phone data was unlawful and that 
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the exclusionary rule bars the admission of the evidence that was the fruit of the unlawful search 
(pg. 614). 
  In Katz v United States, the Justice Stewarts delivers in the opinion of the court, “what a 
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of 
Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area 
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected” (Epstein, Lee, and Thomas G. 
Walker, pg. 468). In Lara, the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy because what 
he does in private is not for others to see. The defendant had an expectation of keeping his gun 
activities private, so he would not violation his probation. Even though the activity the defendant 
is engaged in goes against his probation, none of the less it would have stayed undetectable if his 
Fourth Amendment right had not been violated. In Riley v California, the court states that the 
fact that an arrestee has diminished privacy interests, when “privacy-related concerns are 
weighty enough” a “search many require a warrant, notwithstanding the diminished expectations 
of privacy of the arrestee” (Riley, pg. 8). In Lara, the court acknowledge that due to the Lara’s 
status of a probation would in fact diminish his expectation of privacy, but the courts outweighed 
the benefits of Lara’s probation status with the fact that he signed in invalid condition form that 
made him unaware what he was signing. This was only because the conditions of the Fourth 
Amendment Waiver were unreasonable with what the court saw as reasonable to individuals. 
 The Tenth Circuit Court decision in United States v Dahda (2017), gives police officer 
permission use a mobile interception device to track individuals. The defendant was convicted of 
marijuana distribution. Serving on an invalid wiretap is reviewed under the consideration that the 
information pertained from the wiretap can be viewed as void. On appeal, the defendant calls for 
a motion to suppress wiretap evidence because the wiretap authorization orders had allowed law 
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enforcement to use stationary listening posts outside of the issuing court’s territorial jurisdiction 
(pg. 1105). The courts analyzed the motion by reasoning of whether the wiretap orders permitted 
interception outside the issuing court’s territorial jurisdiction. If so, whether the orders limited 
extra-territorial interception to instances involving a mobile interception device (pg. 1112). The 
court rules that in the event the target telephone numbers are transported outside the territorial 
jurisdiction of the court, interception may take place in any other jurisdiction within the United 
States (pg. 1112). The orders allowed interception outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction 
because there was no geographic restriction on the locations of either the cell phones or the 
listening posts (pg. 1112). What stemmed from the reasoning behind the rationale is whether the 
“mobile interception device” exception applies. The court comes up with three possibilities of 
whether the exception exist; a listening device that is mobile, a cell phone being intercepted, or a 
device that intercepts mobile communications, such as cell phone calls (pg. 1113). The court 
begins by defining the term “mobile” as a noun that modifies interception device. The court later 
interprets the next possibility to treat the cell phones as “mobile interception devices” would be 
impossible to for a “device” to be interpreted as something used to intercept a call. Lastly the 
court decides that the last possibility would require the court to rewrite the statue (pg. 1113). 
Ultimately, concluding that “mobile interception device” is irrelevant to the police ability to 
conduct their jobs using wiretaps. Also deeming it as facially insufficient (pg. 1113-1114). The 
case overall focused less on statutory text or factual facts and more on the perception of the 
Circuit judges. 
 While the Federal Court of Appeals ruled that officers could use wiretaps on individual’s 
cell phones. Years before the ruling, the lower court address the warrantless cell phone search. In 
another case, the Colorado Court of Appeals decided the same way in People v Taylor (2012). 
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The court founded the search of the defendant’s cell phone during a warrantless search of the 
defendant’s call history as lawful, rejecting the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. The 
defendant was arrested in a string operation conducted by undercover officers. As the defendant 
provided an illegal drug purchase, the undercover officers observed as the defendant’s make a 
call on his phone to supply them with their “purchase.” After an outside source that the 
defendant called to supply the undercover officers with their “purchase,” the officers arrested 
both the defendant and his party (pg. 320). After arresting the defendant, the officers seized his 
cell phone as one of the officers opened the call log history of defendant’s cell phone, noting a 
call was recently placed to the defendant’s outside source’s phone (pg. 320). After being 
convicted, the defendant contends he was subject to an unlawful search when the officers 
reviewed his cell phone’s call history without obtaining a warrant. The opinion of the court is 
given by Justice Graham, who starts off by assuming two propositions that applies to case: if the 
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell phone’s call history and, the 
officer’s review of the call history constituted a warrantless search within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment (pg. 321). The court brings up that under the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution states that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless they 
fall under a specifically established and well-delineated exception to the warrant requirement. 
The court looks at the “a search incident to lawful arrest” exception, which allows officers search 
an arrestee’s person and the area within the arrestee’s immediate control when making a lawful 
arrest (pg. 321-322). While the state has not set precedent of the matter of whether a search 
incident to arrest may include a search of a cell phone’s contents or even how thorough the 
search might proceed as, the courts conclude that under the circumstances that the search of 
defendant’s cell phone’s call history would be considered lawful search incident to arrest (pg. 
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322). Before concluding, the court further gives its opinion how cell phone users could prevent 
searches of information on the cell phones is by a user password protecting the electronic device. 
This solution does not lie with a revamped analysis of the search incident to arrest doctrine (pg. 
325). With the both rulings taken place within the Tenth Circuit court district, the court have 
made their stance clear that warrantless cell phone searches on an arrestee is permissible under 
their district. 
 Lastly, the Eleventh Circuit court ruled from a unique perspective of conducting 
warrantless cellphone searches at the border in United States v. Vergara (2018) when examining 
whether agents from the Department of Homeland Security violated the Fourth Amendment 
rights of individuals when performing warrantless searches of cellphones at the entry to the 
United States in Tampa, Florida. The facts of the case are the defendant, a United States citizen, 
returned to Tampa, Florida on a cruise ship from Cozumel, Mexico with three phones. An officer 
at the border searched the defendant’s luggage and found a phone inside of it where the officer 
proceeds to request the defendant to turn the phone on to looked through its contents. After 
looking through the phone, the officer notified the Department of Homeland Security after 
finding a video of two topless female minors. The agents than decided to search through all three 
phones of the defendant for forensic examination for any traces of child pornography (pg. 1311). 
After being convicted, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from his 
cellphones. The court affirmed the defendant’s conviction stating that the forensic searches of the 
defendant’s cellphones occurred at the border, not as searches incident to arrest as the defendant 
tries to argue using the Riley case. Also ruling that border searches never requires a warrant or 
probable cause (pg. 1311). The courts start off by acknowledging that usually when a search is 
undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of the criminal wrongdoing, 
  Taylor 39 
 
reasonableness requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant. While trying to stay align with the 
Fourth Amendment, the court veers away to make the argument that at the border, preceding the 
adoption of the Fourth Amendment that is has always been reasonable by the single fact that the 
person or item in question that had entered the country from outside (pg. 1312). The forensic 
searches of the defendant’s cellphones required neither a warrant nor probable cause because the 
border searches never require there to be one as it has always required reasonable suspicion at 
the border of highly invasive searches such as a strip search or an x-ray examination (pg. 1312). 
The court concludes that the history of warrantless searches at the border is as long as the time 
the Fourth Amendment has been implemented into society. Along with the fact that the 
defendant did not address whether reasonable suspicion existed in his case that gave him an 
expectation of privacy (pg. 1312-1313). 
 The ruling of Vergara, has left open an interest ruling that the Supreme Court would take 
up when ruling whether law enforcement practice was constitutional at the border. When the 
Court of Appeals ruled that warrantless searches at the border has been implement before the 
existed of the Fourth Amendment, the ruling left an unclear Riley ruling of the significant of 
privacy interests implicated in cell phone searches in which the Supreme Court has already ruled 
on (pg. 1312-1313). While the court ultimately upheld warrantless searches, Circuit Judge Jill 
Pryor dissented that when it comes to cell phone searches, these ‘physical realities’ no longer 
exist because individuals could not carry across the border all the mail they had received, 
pictures they had taken, and books they had read (pg. 1315). While in Riley, the court 
distinguished a modern cell phone as misleading because many of them are in fact 
minicomputers that can store a large capacity of data (Riley, pg. 8). As at the border, officers 
might have stumbled across an item such as a diary here and there, but in comparison of today 
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where ninety percent of American adults who own a cell phone carries such sensitive 
information that allowing the police to scrutinize such records on a routine basis is different from 
allowing them to search a personal item or two (Riley, pg. 10). When the court has already made 
is distinctive difference of an officer doing a routine search, the courts now have to apply what 
they hold up in Riley, which will hold up to border searches where warrantless searches was in 
existence before the Constitution or technology was effective. 
Police Officers Carrying Out Good Protocol 
 Well showing the repercussion officers take upon their selves in not getting a search 
warrant to search and seize objects from a suspect, the court have been split on the issue to either 
reject the officer’s findings or apply them using exceptions. If an officer can just apply for a 
search warrant to evaluate evidence, not only can their argument stand in court, but also, they 
can be more efficient in their police work to avoid constantly going to court of justify their 
actions. In the United States v. Rarick the officer was able to prove his action of a cell phone 
search by obtaining a search warrant and having probable cause. It all plays out first when the 
defendant is stopped by a police officer outside a Cheap Tobacco store after being determined he 
had a suspended license (pg. 1). The officer stopped the defendant to determine the registered 
owner and thus driving with a suspended license. During the stop, the defendant became 
argumentative and at some point, removed his smartphone from his pocket, held it up, 
approached the officer stating he was recording her. In which the officer took the phone and 
placed it on the trunk of the defendant’s car that propelled the defendant to retrieve the cell from 
the trunk. The officer approached him to see he was manipulating his phone and ordered the 
defendant to stop. He was arrested shortly afterwards, and his cell phone seized as evidence (pg. 
1-2). The defendant refused to consent to a search of his phone, in which the police filed an 
  Taylor 41 
 
affidavit for a search warrant, citing the offense of obstructing official business, with the Ohio 
state judge authorizing the warrant to include all information on the phone including previously 
erased data. After the warrant was executed, the office connected the defendant’s phone to a 
computer that displayed all the phones contents to come across pictures and videos of child 
pornography (pg. 3). The police put a request of another search warrant to search the phone 
further citing probable cause to search for evidence of child pornography. After a third warrant 
was issued to search the contents of the defendant’s vehicle and home, he was arrested of child 
pornography among other convicts. The defendant moved to suppress all the evidence found on 
his phone and the fruits obtained from the search which was first struck down by the district 
court. By the time of his appeal, he argues that the first search warrant failed the Fourth 
Amendment’s requirement and that the manner of the search was unreasonable and 
unconstitutional (pg. 4). “The Fourth Amendment further requires that “no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized” (pg. 5). Proceeding to follow the Fourth 
Amendment clarity, the court analyzed the defendant’s arguments that the first search warrant 
was overly broad for lacking to specify the electronic evidence sought from the phone nor the 
crime to which the evidence was connected (pg. 5-6). The first search warrant did not contain 
that information that questions the court as to whether the affidavit, in which the first warrant 
referred was valid to satisfy the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment, also 
considers the warrant’s failure to specify the date of the confrontation between the officer and 
the defendant (pg. 6-7). The court starts off by stating that certain sections of the first warrant 
were not limited to files specific to what the government was searching for, of a video or image 
taken by the defendant on the date and around the time of his arrest (pg. 7). Even though the 
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affidavit text was ambiguous, the officer had probable cause to search images or videos, 
therefore, satisfy the particularity requirement (pg. 8). Clarifying their decision that although in 
searching electronic devices where criminals can easily “hide, mislabel, or manipulate flies to 
conceal criminal activity,” it does not give the government the right to roam throughout all the 
flies on the device (pg. 6). The next argument that the court addresses is whether the manner of 
the search was unconstitutional due to the officers not searching the content of the phone where 
the evidence would most likely to be. The court declines to get into what methodologies the 
officer should have taken instead of inclining to examine whether the search executed under the 
facts of the case was reasonable (pg. 9). The court vouched that the officer targeted his search to 
where he reasonably believed the recording was most likely to be found. With the reasoning that 
the officer took guarded steps to examine the contents of the phone in a careful manner, the court 
denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence (pg. 10).  
 The impact from this ruling is the officer went through the necessary steps to search the 
evidences by putting in multiple warrants to search different contents of the phone. Instead of 
going on a hunch to recover evidence after witnessing the defendant manipulating evidence, the 
officers could have just looked through the phone without a warrant to try to recover the 
evidence and argue in court that it was in good faith to preserve the evidence. He instead took the 
right protocol to proceed in manner. 
Data Analysis 
The data analysis proportion of the research paper details whether the different rulings 
that the courts project have any effect on police force to do their job. Throughout the course of 
the paper, it is shown that some courts rule the use of warrantless cell phone data and tracking 
location as unconstitutional. Other courts rule in the favor of police carrying out these methods 
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for varies reasons containing to the exceptions of the Fourth Amendment and the revolving time 
that technological has impacted society.  I wonder what was the affect that the Court of Appeals 
rulings have on the rate of crime in relations to the weather police are granted the power to 
search and seizure cell phones without a warrant. In concurrence with the Court of Appeals 
cases, the data analysis looks at a relevant timeframe in which the court cases have been passed, 
in correlation to the population within the states of the Circuit district. It also factors in the 
violent crime rate from each state, including District of Columbia, overtime to display a trend of 
whether states violent crime rate have fluctuated or decrease in time. Based on data from the 
Federal Bureau of Investigations, the violent crime rate is compiled of statistics on violent crime; 
murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault (Federal Bureau of 
Investigations). Contrast, the chances that crime rates correlates when police are subjected to 
obtain a warrant to search cell phones. Along with this reasoning, a treatment was placed on each 
state, carrying the number 0 or 1. Being assigned 0 meant that the state is not in violation of the 
4th Amendment prior to the case being ruled. Being assigned 1 meant that the state is in violation 
of the 4th Amendment. For instance, since the topic of warrantless cell phone searches are 
particularly new to courts passing regulations, all states are assigned a 0 up until the point the 
court in their district pass a ruling that the police can continue proceeding in warrantless cell 
phone searches or that the protocol police officers have been taken is in violation of the 4th 
Amendment. My hypothesis is that whenever the Court of Appeals passing a ruling of whether 
police officers need to obtain a warrant for unauthorize search of cell phone contents, there will 
be no effect on the crime rate. This is because historically over the years, crime rates have 
dropped significantly. From there, a treatment was construed on each state regarding whether the 
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state was in violation of the Fourth Amendment until a ruling was interact that would make the 
state non-violate depending on the ruling. 
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The regression analysis figure show that there is no correlation between the violence crime rate 
and the rulings of the Circuit 
Court rulings. For instance, a 
one percentage increase in 
Alaska is associated with a 
35.27 increase in the 
percentage to violent crime 
rate. Meaning that police 
lowering crime rate in 
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regarding warrantless cell phone searches holds no merit. For example, in the graph, Alaska 
crime rate has increased in the last three years. Alaska falls under the United States v Lara 
(2016) ruling in the Ninth Circuit Court where the court ruled that police would need to obtain a 
warrant to search the contents of a cell phone. It could be said that the hypothesis that was 
constructed was incorrect due to the time of the case ruling in 2016, violent crime rate has 
increased. If when the court rules in favor of protecting the people’s rights, crime rates would 
increase. There are many factors that comes into play; as to whether historically has Alaska been 
a violent state to begin with, the economic climate of the state, how many homeless people are 
populated in Alaska. These variables are not counting in the data analysis looking at the state, but 
rather just the statistic violent crime rate overall. 
Conclusion 
  Court of Appeals rulings are essentially importance to the social and political climax of 
America. When different circuit courts are split on decisions, such as the protocol police takes 
when carrying out a warrantless search of cell phone contents, laws are applied with different 
meaning to different parts of the country. Ultimately, it is up to the Supreme Court to assert itself 
as a ‘tiebreaker’ to set precedent on an issue that the entire country must follow. The ruling that 
the Court of Appeals pass is also important because when cases are not selected for review by 
the Supreme Court, the issue goes unsettle that further hinder the process of the country to 
collective come to terms on the same level. While matters remain split on the circuit level, my 
hypothesis was proven right that regardless of the ruling that circuit courts make to the protocol 
the police officers make, there is no correlation to the violent crime rate.  
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